





Regulating the Shadow Banking System
ABSTRACT The shadow banking system played a major role in the recent
ﬁnancial crisis but remains largely unregulated. We propose principles for its
regulation and describe a speciﬁc proposal to implement those principles. We
document how the rise of shadow banking was helped by regulatory and legal
changes that gave advantages to three main institutions: money-market mutual
funds (MMMFs) to capture retail deposits from traditional banks, securitization
to move assets of traditional banks off their balance sheets, and repurchase
agreements (repos) that facilitated the use of securitized bonds as money. The
evolution of a bankruptcy safe harbor for repos was crucial to the growth and
efficiency of shadow banking; regulators can use access to this safe harbor
as the lever to enforce new rules. History has demonstrated two successful
methods for regulating privately created money: strict guidelines on collateral,
and government-guaranteed insurance. We propose the use of insurance for
MMMFs, combined with strict guidelines on collateral for both securitization
and repos, with regulatory control established by chartering new forms of
narrow banks for MMMFs and securitization, and using the bankruptcy safe
harbor to incentivize compliance on repos.
A
fter the Great Depression, by some combination of luck and genius,
the United States created a bank regulatory system that oversaw a
period of about 75 years free of ﬁnancial panics, considerably longer than
any such period since the founding of the republic. When this quiet period
ﬁnally ended in 2007, the ensuing panic did not begin in the traditional sys-
tem of banks and depositors, but instead was centered in a new “shadow”
banking system. This system performs the same functions as traditional
banking, but the names of the players are different, and the regulatory
structure is light or nonexistent. In its broadest deﬁnition, shadow banking
includes such familiar institutions as investment banks, money-market
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forms, such as sale-and-repurchase agreements (repos); and more esoteric
instruments such as asset-backed securities (ABSs), collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP).
1
Following the panic of 2007–09, Congress passed major regulatory
reform of the ﬁnancial sector in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Dodd-Frank includes many provisions
relevant to shadow banking; for example, hedge funds must now register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), much over-the-
counter derivatives trading will be moved to exchanges and clearinghouses,
and all systemically important institutions will be regulated by the Federal
Reserve. Retail lenders will now be subject to consistent, federal-level
regulation through the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau housed
within the Federal Reserve.
Although Dodd-Frank takes some useful steps in the regulation of
shadow banking, there are still large gaps where it is almost silent. Three
important gaps involve the regulation of MMMFs, securitization, and repos.
Fortunately, the law also created a council of regulators, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, with signiﬁcant power to identify and manage
systemic risks, including the power to recommend signiﬁcant changes in
regulation, if deemed necessary for ﬁnancial stability.
2 We will argue that
the above three areas played the central role in the recent crisis and are in
need of further regulation.
MMMFs, securitization, and repos are key elements of what has been
called off-balance-sheet ﬁnancing, which differs from the on-balance-sheet
financing of traditional banks in several important ways. Figure 1 is the
classic textbook depiction of the financial intermediation of loans on
bank balance sheets in the traditional banking system. In step A depositors
transfer money to the bank in return for credit on a checking or savings
account, from which they can withdraw at any time. In step B the bank
lends these funds to a borrower and holds this loan on its balance sheet
to maturity.
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1. Some of the important shadow banking terms are deﬁned later in the paper and in the
appendix. In other work (Gorton and Metrick 2010, forthcoming), we refer to the speciﬁc
combination of repos and securitization as “securitized banking.” Since this paper takes a
broader view to include activities beyond repos and securitization, we use the more common
but less precise term “shadow banking.”
2. This power, crucial for the future regulation of shadow banking, is granted in sec-
tion 120 of the Dodd-Frank legislation. Although any new regulations cannot exceed current
statutory authority, this authority would still allow for signiﬁcant new regulation of MMMFs,
repos, and securitization without the need for new legislation.
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were ended in the United States in 1934 through the introduction of federal
deposit insurance. With deposits thus insured, depositors have little incen-
tive to withdraw their funds when the solvency of the bank comes into
question. Deposit insurance works well for retail investors but leaves a
challenge for institutions with large cash holdings. With deposit insurance
capped at $100,000 per account, institutions such as pension funds, mutual
funds, states and municipalities, and cash-rich nonﬁnancial companies lack
easy access to safe, interest-earning, short-term investments. The shadow
banking system of off-balance-sheet lending (ﬁgure 2) provides a solution
to this problem.
Step 2 in figure 2 is the analogue to step A in figure 1, but with one
important difference. To achieve protection similar to that provided by
deposit insurance, an MMMF or other institutional investor receives col-
lateral from the bank. In practice, this transaction takes the form of a repo:
the institutional investor deposits $X and receives some asset from the
bank as collateral; the bank agrees to repurchase the same asset at some
future time (perhaps the next day) for $Y. The percentage (Y − X)/X is
called the repo rate and (when annualized) is analogous to the interest rate
on a bank deposit.



























Figure 1. Traditional On-Balance-Sheet Intermediation
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the value of the asset used as collateral; the difference is called a “haircut.”
For example, if an asset has a market value of $100 and a bank sells it for
$80 with an agreement to repurchase it for $88, the repo rate is 10 percent
(= [88 − 80]/80) and the haircut is 20 percent ([100 − 80]/100). If the bank
defaults on its promise to repurchase the asset, the investor keeps the
collateral.
3
The step that moves this ﬁnancing off the balance sheet of the bank is
step 4, where loans are pooled and securitized. We will discuss this step in
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3. As we discuss later, repos are carved out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process: They
are not subject to the automatic stay rule. If one party to the repo transaction fails, the other
party can unilaterally terminate the transaction and keep the cash or sell the bond, depending






















































Figure 2. Off-Balance-Sheet Intermediation in the Shadow Banking System
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zation are either purchased directly by institutional investors in step 5 or
used as collateral for other loans in step 2. In effect, the bonds created by
securitization are often the main source of collateral that provides insurance
for large depositors.
Each of the components in this off-balance-sheet ﬁnancing cycle has
grown rapidly since 1980. The most dramatic growth has been in securi-
tization: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data show that the ratio of off-
balance-sheet to on-balance-sheet loan funding grew from zero in 1980 to
over 60 percent in 2007. To illustrate the growth in MMMFs, ﬁgure 3 shows
total bank assets, bank demand deposits, mutual fund assets, and MMMF
assets as percentages of total ﬁnancial assets: the bank share of total assets
fell by about 20 percentage points from 1980 to 2008.
As we discuss later, there are no comprehensive data measuring the repo
market. However, an indication of its growth is the growth in the balance
sheets of the institutions that play the role of banks in repo transactions as
depicted in ﬁgure 2. Before the crisis, these were essentially the investment
banks, or broker-dealers. In order for these institutions to act as banks and
offer repos, they needed to hold bonds that could be used as collateral. The
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Figure 3. Money Market Mutual Funds, Mutual Funds, Demand Deposits, and 
Bank Assets, 1975–2008
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for example, if the bond is an asset-backed security with a coupon rate of 
6 percent, and the repo rate is 3 percent, the bank earns the difference. This
required that their balance sheets grow significantly as the repo market
grew. Figure 4 shows that broker-dealer assets indeed grew rapidly after
about 1990, while commercial bank assets grew at a rate much closer to
that of GDP.
Why did shadow banking grow so much? We address this question in
section I. One force came from the supply side, where a series of innova-
tions and regulatory changes eroded the competitive advantage of banks
and bank deposits. A second force came from the demand side, where
demand for collateral for ﬁnancial transactions gave impetus to the devel-
opment of securitization and the use of repos as a money-like instrument.
Both of these forces were aided by court decisions and regulatory rules that
allowed securitization and repos special treatment under the bankruptcy
code. A central idea of this paper is that the bankruptcy safe harbor for repos
has been crucial to the growth of shadow banking, and that regulators can
use access to this safe harbor as the lever to enforce minimum repo haircuts
and control leverage.
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Figure 4. Assets of Broker-Dealers, Commercial Banks, Households, and Nonﬁnancial
Corporations, 1958–2010
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tated by regulatory changes, then why not simply reverse all these changes?
Would such reversals bring us back to a safer system dominated by tradi-
tional banks? We do not believe that such a radical course is possible even
if it were desirable, which it is not, in our view. The regulatory changes
were, in many cases, an endogenous response to the demand for efﬁcient,
bankruptcy-free collateral in large ﬁnancial transactions: if repos had not
been granted this status, the private sector would have sought a substitute,
which likely would have been even less efﬁcient. In any case, we will not
try in this paper to justify the existence of the shadow banking system.
Instead we take the broad outlines of the system as given and ask how the
current regulatory structure could be adapted to make the system safer
without driving its activity into a new unregulated darkness.
In section II we discuss how the shadow banking system broke down in
the crisis. The features of this breakdown are similar to those from previous
banking panics: safe, liquid assets suddenly appeared to be unsafe, lead-
ing to runs. MMMFs, which appeared to be as safe as insured deposits
to many investors, suddenly appeared vulnerable, leading to runs on those
funds. Securitization, which investors had trusted for decades as creating
a form of “information-insensitive” securities free of adverse selection
problems, suddenly lost the conﬁdence of investors: hundreds of billions of
dollars of formerly information-insensitive triple-A-rated securities became
information-sensitive.
4 Since the cost of evaluating all this newly suspect
paper was high, investors simply exited all securitizations. In this new
environment the high-quality collateral necessary for repos no longer
existed. In Gorton and Metrick (forthcoming), we claim that the resulting
run on repos was a key propagation mechanism in the crisis.
Section III applies lessons from the successful regulation of traditional
banking to infer principles for the regulation of shadow banking. History has
demonstrated two methods for reducing the probability of runs in a system.
The ﬁrst, standardized collateralization, was introduced after the Panic of
1837, when some states passed free banking laws under which state bonds
were required to back paper bank notes. Free banking laws were the basis
for the National Bank Acts, which created national bank notes backed by
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4. The “information-sensitive” and “information-insensitive” nomenclature comes from
Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010a, 2010b). “Information-insensitive” roughly means that
the cost of producing private information about the payoff on the security is not worth bear-
ing by potentially informed traders. Such securities do not face adverse selection when sold
or traded. But a crisis occurs when a shock causes production of such private information to
become proﬁtable.
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the United States to trade at par against specie. The second method, govern-
ment insurance, was tried at the state level without great success before the
Civil War and again in the ﬁrst decades of the 20th century. Success ﬁnally
came when, during the Great Depression, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) was created to insure demand deposits. This innovation
stopped the cycle of runs on demand deposits and allowed them to be used
safely as money.
Today, repos have emerged as a new monetary form, and history offers
the same two methods to consider for stabilizing their use. As discussed in
detail in section IV, which describes our speciﬁc proposals, we believe that
insurance would be workable for MMMFs, but that collateralization would
be preferable for repos and securitization. For MMMFs the problems
are straightforward and have already been well addressed by other authors.
We adopt the proposal of the Group of Thirty (2009): MMMFs would
have the choice of being treated either as narrow savings banks (NSBs)
with stable net asset values, or as conservative investment funds with ﬂoat-
ing net asset values and no guaranteed return. Under this system, the
former would fall clearly within the official financial safety net, but the
latter would not.
5
The narrow banks proposed by the Group of Thirty for MMMFs provide
a model for regulating securitization based on the chartering of “narrow
funding banks” (NFBs) as vehicles to control and monitor securitization,
combined with regulatory oversight of acceptable collateral and minimum
haircuts for repos. Under this regime the rules for acceptable collateral
would allow that collateral to play a role analogous to that of the state
bonds backing bank notes in the free banking period, or the U.S. Treasury
securities backing greenbacks during the national banking era; minimum
repo haircuts would play a role analogous to capital ratios for depository
institutions. The danger of exit from this system and the creation of yet
another shadow banking system would be mitigated by allowing only
licensed NFBs and repos the special protections provided under the bank-
ruptcy code.
Section V concludes with a discussion of related topics in regulation
and monetary policy. The appendix supplements the text with a glossary of
shadow banking terminology used in the paper.
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5. The Group of Thirty (2009) proposal uses the term “special purpose banks” for what
we call “narrow savings banks” for terminological consistency with other parts of our
proposal.
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Shadow banking is the outcome of fundamental changes in the ﬁnancial
system in the last 30 to 40 years, as a result of private innovation and regu-
latory changes that together led to the decline of the traditional banking
model. Faced by competition from nonbanks and their products, such as junk
bonds and commercial paper, on the asset side of their balance sheets, and
from MMMFs on the liability side, commercial banks became less prof-
itable and sought new proﬁt opportunities.
6 Slowly, traditional banks exited
the regulated sector. In this section we review in more detail the three
important changes in banking discussed briefly above: MMMFs, securi-
tization, and repos.
I.A. Money-Market Mutual Funds
Since the 1970s there has been a major shift in the preferred medium for
deposit-like transactions away from demand deposits toward MMMFs.
7
MMMFs were a response to interest rate ceilings on demand deposits
(Regulation Q). In the late 1970s the assets of MMMFs totaled around
$4 billion. In 1977 interest rates rose sharply and MMMFs grew in response,
by more than $2 billion per month during the ﬁrst 5 months of 1979 (Cook
and Dufﬁeld 1979). The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 authorized banks
to issue short-term deposit accounts with some transaction features but no
interest rate ceiling. These were known as “money-market deposit accounts.”
Michael Keeley and Gary Zimmerman (1985) document that these accounts
attracted $300 billion in the 3 months after their introduction in December
1982, and they argue that the result was a substitution of wholesale for retail
deposits, and of direct price competition for nonprice competition, both
responses resulting in increased bank deposit costs. MMMFs really took
off in the mid-1980s, their assets growing from $76.4 billion in 1980 to
$1.8 trillion by 2000, an increase of over 2,000 percent. Assets of MMMFs
reached a peak of $3.8 trillion in 2008, making them one of the most sig-
niﬁcant ﬁnancial product innovations of the last 50 years.
An important feature of MMMFs that distinguishes them from other
mutual funds is that they seek to maintain a net asset value of $1 per share.
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6. These changes have been much noted and much studied, so we only briefly review
them here. See Keeley and Zimmerman (1985), Bryan (1988), Barth, Brumbaugh, and
Litan (1990, 1992), Boyd and Gertler (1993, 1994), Edwards and Mishkin (1995), and
Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), among many others.
7. MMMFs are registered investment companies that are regulated by the SEC in accor-
dance with Rule 2a-7, adopted pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940.
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deposits. MMMFs are closely regulated; they are required, for example, to
invest only in high-quality securities that would seem to have little credit
risk. The SEC has recently proposed a series of changes to MMMF regu-
lation; these regulations, part of the Investment Company Act of 1940
(as amended), have come under review by a working group of regulators,
but none of the recent proposals would change the fact that MMMFs are
not explicitly insured. The maintenance of the $1 share price was almost
universally successful in the decades leading up to the crisis. This may
have instilled a false sense of security in investors who took the implicit
promise as equivalent to the explicit insurance offered by deposit accounts.
The difference, of course, is that banks pay for deposit insurance (and pass
that cost along to depositors), whereas the promise to pay $1 per share
costs the MMMFs nothing. In the crisis, the government made good on the
implicit promise by explicitly guaranteeing MMMFs, and in the wake of
that move it may not be credible for the government to commit to any other
strategy. As long as MMMFs have implicit, cost-free government backing,
they will have a cost advantage over insured deposits. We return to this
point in section IV, where we adopt the proposals of the Group of Thirty
(2009) for MMMFs to either pay for explicit insurance or drop the ﬁction
of stable value.
I.B. Securitization
Securitization is the process by which traditionally illiquid loans are
packaged and sold into the capital markets. This is accomplished by sell-
ing large portfolios of loans to special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which are
legal entities that in turn issue rated securities linked to the loan portfolios.
Figure 5 illustrates how securitization works. An originating firm lends
money to a number of borrowers. A number of these loans are then pooled
into a portfolio, which is sold to an SPV, a master trust in the ﬁgure. The
SPV ﬁnances these purchases by selling securities in the capital markets.
These securities are classiﬁed into tranches, which are ranked by seniority
and rated accordingly. The whole process thus takes loans that traditionally
would have been held on the balance sheet of the originating firm and
creates from them marketable securities that can be sold and traded via the
off-balance-sheet SPV.
Securitization is a large and important market. Figure 6 shows the
annual issuance since 1990 of all securitized products, including nonagency
mortgage-backed securities, the major nonmortgage categories (credit
card receivables, auto loans, and student loans), and other asset classes; for
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Figure 5. The Securitization Process
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Source: Thomson Reuters. 
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Figure 6. Issuance of Corporate Debt and Asset-Backed Securities, 1990–2009
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(including convertible debt). Starting at about the same level, the two series
rise roughly in parallel until around 2000, when securitization begins to
grow explosively. Securitization peaks in 2006 and then falls precipitously
in the crisis.
To understand the potential economic efﬁciencies of securitization, it is
important to understand how the SPV structure works. An SPV has no
purpose other than the transaction or transactions for which it was created;
it can make no substantive decisions. The rules governing SPVs are set
down in advance and carefully circumscribe their activities. Indeed, no one
works at an SPV, and it has no physical location.8
Two other essential features of an SPV concern bankruptcy. First, SPVs
are “bankruptcy remote”; that is, the insolvency of the sponsor (the bank or
ﬁrm originating the loans) has no impact on the SPV. In particular, creditors
of a bankrupt sponsor cannot claw back assets from the SPV. Second, the
SPV itself is designed so that it can never, as a practical matter, become
legally bankrupt. The most straightforward way to achieve this would be for
the SPV to waive its right to ﬁle a voluntary bankruptcy petition, but this is
legally unenforceable. So the way to minimize the risk of either voluntary
or involuntary bankruptcy is to design the SPV in a way that makes the risk
of bankruptcy very small.9
Why would a bank choose to move some assets off its balance sheet
through securitization? There are several costs and benefits of this 
decision, all of which have been changing rapidly over the last several
decades.
BANKRUPTCY. The most important design feature of securitization is that
the ABSs issued by an SPV do not trigger an event of default in the case
where the underlying portfolio does not generate enough cash to make the
contractual coupon payments on the outstanding bonds.10 Instead there is an
early amortization event: the cash that is available is used to make principal
payments early, rather than coupon payments.
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8. This description of securitization and SPVs is based on Gorton and Souleles (2006).
9. See Klee and Butler (2002) for some details on how SPVs are structured to avoid
bankruptcy.
10. The LTV Steel case (In re LTV Steel, Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2001)) threatened the bankruptcy remoteness concept, but the
parties settled before a court decision was handed down, and the parties agreed that there had
been a “true sale” of the assets to the SPV. Although the outcome was ambiguous, it did not
hamper the growth of securitization. There have been no other cases challenging bankruptcy
remoteness. See, for example, Kettering (2008), Schwarcz (2002), and Stark (2002).
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compares securitization with what happens to a secured creditor in bank-
ruptcy and concludes that “securitization reduces the bankruptcy tax on
secured lenders to originators and owners of mortgage loans and other
receivables, and therefore has reduced the bankruptcy premiums charged to
the obligors of mortgage loans and other receivables.” Gorton and Nicholas
Souleles (2006) show empirically that this is an important source of value
to securitization.
TAXES. Debt issued off the balance sheet does not have the advantageous
tax beneﬁts of on-balance-sheet debt. For proﬁtable ﬁrms this can make a
large difference. Consider a bank that is deciding how to ﬁnance a port-
folio of mortgage loans that has the same risk properties as the rest of the
bank’s assets. Proﬁtable ﬁrms with little chance of bankruptcy have a high
likelihood of being able to treat the interest on that debt as a deductible
expense, and so for these ﬁrms it is optimal to ﬁnance on the balance sheet.
For ﬁrms that are less proﬁtable and closer to bankruptcy, which therefore
have a lower likelihood of using this tax shield, it will be relatively more
advantageous to ﬁnance off the balance sheet. Gorton and Souleles (2006)
ﬁnd this to be true empirically, in a study of credit card securitizations. Using
credit ratings as a measure of proﬁtability and bankruptcy risk, Moody’s
(1997a, 1997b) also reaches this conclusion.
MORAL HAZARD. Because the rules governing SPVs permit them very
little discretion, once a portfolio of loans has been transferred to an SPV,
there is no danger of other activities of the SPV imposing costs on the
holders of the securitized bonds. In contrast, the expected bankruptcy costs
to the holder of a bank’s bonds are affected by the other actions of bank
management.
Given the ﬁduciary responsibilities of corporate directors toward equity
holders, and given the familiar principal-agent problems among share-
holders, directors, and managers, moral hazard will always be a potential
concern for bank bondholders. But this concern can be mitigated by the
existence of bank “charter value.” As discussed by Alan Marcus (1984), a
positive charter value gives a bank an incentive to avoid risk taking that
might lead to bankruptcy and the loss of the charter. Bank regulations and
positive charter values are complementary in that banks tend to abide by
regulations—that is, they internalize risk management—when charter values
are high. There is persuasive evidence that, historically, such charter value
at banks did improve risk management, but that this value and the protection
it provided have decreased over time. The competition from junk bonds and
MMMFs, together with deregulation (for example, of interest rate ceilings),
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their risk and reduce their capital.
11
Given the decline in charter values and the resulting increase in bank
risk taking, bank bondholders would face higher moral hazard costs for
on-balance-sheet financing and demand higher returns as compensation.
This provides a cost advantage to securitization that has been growing
over time.
REGULATORY COSTS. One regulatory response to increased risk taking by
banks has been the introduction of speciﬁc capital requirements. In 1981
regulators announced explicit capital requirements for the ﬁrst time in U.S.
banking history: all banks and bank holding companies were required to
hold primary capital of at least 5.5 percent of assets by June 1985. Virtually
all banks did meet these capital requirements by 1986, but it is interesting
how this was accomplished: banks that were capital deﬁcient when the new
requirements were announced tended to grow more slowly than capital-rich
banks (Keeley 1988).
12
If bank regulators impose capital requirements that are binding (that is,
that require banks to hold more capital than they would voluntarily in equi-
librium), then, when charter value is low, bank capital will exit the regulated
bank industry. One way to do this is through off-balance-sheet securiti-
zation, which has no requirements for regulatory capital.
ADVERSE SELECTION. It is sometimes alleged that an investor in securitized
bonds faces an adverse selection problem: loan originators who have better
information about the loans than the investor has might try to put the worst
loans into the portfolio being sold to the SPV. Aware of this problem,
investors and sponsoring ﬁrms have designed several structural mitigants.
First, loan originators are allowed limited discretion in selecting loans for
the portfolio to be securitized. The loans are subject to detailed eligibility
criteria and speciﬁc representations and warranties. Once eligible loans
have been specified, either they are selected for the portfolio at random,
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11. This process is documented by Keeley (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995), Demsetz,
Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996), Galloway, Lee, and Roden (1997), and Gan (2004), among
others.
12. Another important change occurred in 1999, when Congress passed the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act. This act permitted affiliations between banks and securities firms; it
created a special type of bank holding company, called a ﬁnancial holding company, which
is allowed to engage in a wider range of activities (such as insurance underwriting and merchant
banking) or under less stringent regulations (for example, on securities underwriting and
dealing) than traditional bank holding companies. Before then, the ability of banks to engage
in such activities had been strictly constrained by the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956.
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of securitizations retain a residual interest (essentially the equity position)
in them. In principle, these features align the interests of securitization
investors and loan originators (Gorton 2010), and indeed, except in the
case of subprime mortgages, securitization has worked well. When an
entire asset class turns out to be suspect, as happened with subprime mort-
gage securitization, there is clearly a problem, but it is not adverse selection.
With respect to subprime securitizations, the evidence on adverse selection
remains ambiguous.
13
TRANSPARENCY AND CUSTOMIZATION. Evaluation of the creditworthiness
of any bank requires analyses of its balance sheet, operations, manage-
ment, competitors, and so on. Information on each of these elements is
at best only partly disclosed to bank investors, and even in the absence
of moral hazard problems, creditworthiness can vary over time from
changes in ordinary business operations.
14 In comparison, an SPV’s port-
folio is completely known, and any changes over time are noted in the
trustee reports. Although the underlying SPV portfolio may contain
thousands of individual assets and is by no means simple to evaluate, it is
considerably more transparent than a corresponding bank balance sheet,
which may have many such collections of assets and zero disclosure of
individual loans.
With the ability to disclose speciﬁc assets underlying securitized bonds,
off-balance-sheet financing can allow customization of such bonds for
any niche of investors. Investors desiring exposure to (or hedges against)
mortgages, auto loans, or credit card receivables can purchase exactly what
they want through securitized bonds without having to take on exposure to
any other type of asset. Furthermore, although banks can and do offer their
own debt at different levels of seniority, the transparency of SPV portfolios
allows for easier evaluation of the different tranches. One specific type
of customization is used to create safe senior tranches that can trade as
information-insensitive, triple-A-rated securities. The production of these
senior tranches was in part an endogenous response to a rising demand
for safe collateral in repos and other ﬁnancial transactions. We discuss this
special case in the next subsection.
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13. The recent allegations about the Goldman Sachs Abacus transactions (see the SEC
complaint at Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice
Tourre, www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21489.pdf) concern synthetic CDOs,
not traditional securitization. Synthetic securitizations were not quantitatively large.
14. Indeed, Morgan (2002) provides evidence that banks are more opaque than non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
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One key driver of the increased use of repos is the rapid growth of money
under management by institutional investors, pension funds, mutual funds,
states and municipalities, and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. These entities hold cash
for various reasons but would like to have a safe investment that earns
interest, while retaining ﬂexibility to use the cash when needed—in short,
a demand deposit-like product. In the last 30 years these entities have grown
in size and become an important feature of the ﬁnancial landscape. For
example, according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2007,
p. 1, note 1), “In 2003, total world assets of commercial banks amounted
to USD 49 trillion, compared to USD 47 trillion of assets under manage-
ment by institutional investors.” Figure 7 shows this increase as a ratio
of GDP in five large economies: the median ratio more than tripled from
1980 to 2007.
For large depositors like these, repos can act as a substitute for insured
demand deposits because repo agreements are explicitly excluded from
Chapter 11: that is, they are not subject to the automatic stay. Instead, repos,
like derivatives, have a special status under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The repo contract allows either party to unilaterally enforce the termination
provisions of the agreement as a result of a bankruptcy ﬁling by the other
party. A depositor, for example, can unilaterally terminate its repo with a
bank when the bank becomes insolvent and sell the collateral. Without this
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for the bankruptcy proceedings to conclude in order to be repaid.
15
Repo collateral can be rehypothecated; that is, the collateral received in
a repo deposit can be freely reused in another transaction with an unrelated
third party. For example, bonds received as collateral can be posted to a
third party as collateral in a derivatives transaction; that party can then
borrow against the same collateral, and so on. As the BIS (1999, pp. 7–8)
has pointed out, this results in “high levels of ‘velocity’ in repo markets.
This occurs when a single piece of collateral is used to effect settlement
in a number of contracts on the same day. It allows the daily repo trading
volume of a particular note issue to exceed the outstanding amount of the
issue, as participants are able to borrow and lend a single piece of collateral
repeatedly over the course of a day.” Manmohan Singh and James Aitken
(2010) argue that measures of repos are signiﬁcantly larger when rehypoth-
ecation is taken into account.
16
The legal infrastructure facilitating the use of repos as money has
evolved as their volume has grown. Since 1978, the year a new bankruptcy
code was adopted, both the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act have provided exemptions for certain kinds of financial
contracts. It was in 1984 that the bankruptcy code was amended to allow
parties to a repo to liquidate collateral without the counterparty going into
bankruptcy.
17 But this applied only to repos based on Treasury securities,
agency securities, bank certiﬁcates of deposit, and bankers’ acceptances.
18
In 2005 the Bankruptcy Reform Act expanded the deﬁnition of a repo to
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15. See, for example, Johnson (1997) and Schroeder (1996). The safe harbor provision
for repo transactions was recently upheld in a court lawsuit brought by American Home
Mortgage Investment Corp. against Lehman Brothers. See Schweitzer, Grosshandler, and
Gao (2008).
16. Rehypothecation creates a multiplier process for collateral, similar to the more
familiar money multiplier. Since there are no ofﬁcial data on repos, the size of this multiplier is
not known. Fegatelli (2010) looks at this issue using data from Clearstream, a Luxembourg-
based clearinghouse. See also Adrian and Shin (2008), who link the use of repos to monetary
policy.
17. The amendment was motivated by the Lombard-Wall decision (see Lombard-Wall,
Inc. v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., No. 82 B 11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)), which held
that an automatic stay provision prevented the depositor who held the collateral from selling
the collateral without court permission. See, for example, Garbade (2006) and Krimminger
(2006).
18. It is not clear that actual market practice was limited to this set of securities. In fact,
the evidence is that it was not. For example, according to Liu (2003), “In recent years market
participants have turned to money market instruments, mortgage and asset-backed securities,
corporate bonds and foreign sovereign bonds as collateral for repo agreements.” No court
cases have tested this.
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bankruptcy safe harbor protection.
19
The unfortunate reality is that no ofﬁcial data on repos exist other than
what the Federal Reserve collects with regard to the amounts transacted by
the 18 primary dealer banks. According to these data, primary dealers
reported ﬁnancing $4.5 trillion in ﬁxed-income securities with repos as of
March 4, 2008. However, these data are known to cover only a fraction of
the U.S. market.
20 BIS economists Peter Hördahl and Michael King (2008,
p. 37) report that repo markets doubled in size from 2002 to 2007, “with
gross amounts outstanding at year-end 2007 of roughly $10 trillion in each
of the US and euro repo markets, and another $1 trillion in the UK repo
market.” They also report that the U.S. repo market exceeded $10 trillion
in mid-2008, including double counting.
21 The European repo market, gen-
erally viewed as smaller than the U.S. market, was 64.87 trillion in June
2009, having peaked at 66.78 trillion in June 2007, according to the Inter-
national Capital Market Association (ICMA) European Repo Market Sur-
vey (2010). According to ﬁgures published in ICMA’s June 2009 survey,
the repo market globally grew at an average annual rate of 25 percent
between 2001 and 2007. Although the available evidence strongly sug-
gests that the repo market is very large, it is impossible to say how large
it is in the United States.
We have described the repo market as essentially a deposit market,
but repos have a number of other signiﬁcant uses as well. They are used to
hedge derivative positions and to hedge primary security issuance. Repos
are also important for maintaining “no arbitrage” relationships between
cash and synthetic instruments. A very important use of repos is in taking
“short” positions in securities markets. By using a repo, a market partici-
pant can sell a security that he or she does not own by borrowing it from
another party in the repo market. Without a repo market (or an analogous
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19. See Krimminger (2006), Garbade (2006), Smith (2007), Sissoko (2010), Johnson
(1997), Schroeder (1996), and Walters (1984).
20. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data cover only the U.S. primary dealers and thus
show an even lower ﬁgure than the Federal Reserve’s other numbers.
21. “Double counting” refers to counting both repo and reverse repo (see the appendix)
in the same transaction. The extent of this issue is unclear, as no data exist on the extent of
involvement of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in repos; only ﬁnancial ﬁrms have been counted, estimated,
or surveyed. Again, anecdotally, many nonﬁnancial ﬁrms’ treasury departments (for example,
Westinghouse, IBM, and Microsoft) invest in repos, as do institutional investors and states
and municipalities, as discussed above.
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also an important mechanism for obtaining leverage, especially for hedge
funds. There are many such examples. It is for all these reasons that repos
have been described as the core of the ﬁnancial system (Comotto 2010).
II. The Role of Shadow Banking in the Financial Crisis
The chronology of events in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09 is well known,
and a growing number of papers address various aspects of the crisis.
22
In this section we brieﬂy summarize the crisis as a run on various forms of
“safe” short-term debt.
A proximate cause of the crisis was a shock to home prices, which had
a large detrimental effect on subprime mortgages. In turn, ABSs linked to
subprime mortgages quickly lost value. The shock spread quickly to other
asset classes as entities based on short-term debt were unable to roll over the
debt or faced withdrawals. Essentially, there was a run on short-term debt.
The epicenters were the repo market, the market for ABCP, and MMMFs.
We brieﬂy discuss each in turn.
Gorton and Metrick (2010, forthcoming) and Gorton (2010) have argued
that the core problem in the ﬁnancial crisis was a run on repos. The panic
occurred when depositors in repo transactions with banks feared that the
banks might fail and they would have to sell the collateral in the market to
recover their money, possibly at a loss given that so much collateral was
being sold at once. In reaction, investors increased repo haircuts. Tri Vi
Dang, Gorton, and Bengt Holmström (2010a, 2010b) argue that a haircut
amounts to a tranching of the collateral to recreate an information-insensitive
security in the face of the shock, so that it is again liquid.
An increase in a repo haircut is tantamount to a withdrawal from the
issuing bank. Think of a bond worth $100 that was completely financed
in the repo market with a zero haircut. A 20 percent haircut on the same
bond would require that the bank finance $20 some other way. In effect,
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22. Among many others, Brunnermeier (2009), Adrian and Shin (2010), Krishnamurthy
(2010), He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2010a, 2010b), and
Gorton (2010) document and analyze the crisis. Some examples of theory-oriented papers
are Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Geanakoplos
(2009), Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010a, 2010b), He and Xiong (2009), Pagano and
Volpin (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (2009), Uhlig (2009), and Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden
(2010).
12367-05a_Gorton-rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:14 AM  Page 279$20 has been withdrawn from the bank. If no one will provide financing
to the bank through new security issuance or a loan, the bank will have
to sell assets. In the crisis, withdrawals in the form of increased repo hair-
cuts caused deleveraging, spreading the subprime crisis to other asset
classes.
It was not only in the repo market that problems occurred. There were
also runs on other types of entities that were heavily dependent on short-term
debt and held portfolios of ABSs. ABCP conduits and structured investment
vehicles (SIVs) are operating companies that purchased long-term ABSs
and financed them with short-term debt, largely commercial paper. Just
before the crisis began, ABCP conduits had about $1.4 trillion in total assets
(Carey, Correa, and Kotter 2009). Most ABCP programs were sponsored
by banks. Daniel Covits, Nellie Liang, and Gustavo Suarez (2009, p. 7)
report that “more than half of ABCP daily issuance has maturities of 1 to
4 days [referred to as “overnight”], and the average maturity of outstanding
paper is about 30 days” (see also Carey, Correa, and Kotter 2009). Our
reform proposals below also address ABCP conduits and SIVs.
MMMFs were also hit hard during the crisis. MMMFs are not just a retail
product; they managed 24 percent of U.S. business short-term assets in
2006 (Brennan and others 2009). At that time, just before the crisis, these
funds held liabilities of ABCP conduits, SIVs, and troubled ﬁnancial ﬁrms
such as Lehman Brothers. Upon Lehman’s failure, concern that these funds
would have trouble maintaining their implicit promise of a $1 net asset
value induced some investors to withdraw their funds. Faced with a run,
these entities were forced to sell assets at fire-sale prices (Brennan and
others 2009). There was a ﬂight to quality: investors moved assets out of
MMMFs that invested mainly in private sector debt and into MMMFs that
primarily invested in U.S. Treasury debt. From September to December
2008, the former suffered a net cash outflow of $234 billion while the
latter received a net inﬂow of $489 billion (Brennan and others 2009). On
September 29, 2008, the government announced its Temporary Guarantee
Program for Money Market Funds; this temporarily guaranteed certain
account balances in MMMFs that qualiﬁed.
In summary, the ﬁnancial crisis was centered in several types of short-
term debt (repos, ABCP, MMMF shares) that were initially perceived as
safe and “money-like” but later found to be imperfectly collateralized.
In this way the crisis amounted to a banking panic, structurally similar to
centuries of previous panics involving money-like instruments such as bank
notes and demand deposits, but with the “banks” taking a new form. To
regulate this new form of banking, we turn next to the lessons of history.
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Bank regulation has been at the forefront of public policy issues in ﬁnance
since the founding of the United States. The essential feature of banking
is the provision of “money,” that is, a medium that can be easily used to
conduct transactions without losses to insiders (that is, the better-informed
party). Throughout U.S. history, a central aim of government involvement
has been to provide a regulatory structure that ensures the existence of such
a safe medium of exchange and avoids systemic banking crises. Before the
creation of federal deposit insurance in 1934, the government’s efforts to
ensure the safety of bank-produced media of exchange took two primary
forms. The ﬁrst was safe and transparent collateral backing for bank money.
The idea was that instead of backing bank money with opaque long-term
loans, it should be backed by speciﬁed government securities. The second
was various kinds of insurance schemes tried by the states. It is also worth
commenting briefly on the role of private bank clearinghouses, which
developed into institutions that sought to safeguard the credibility of bank
money. In this section we brieﬂy review these regulatory attempts.
Before the Civil War the predominant form of bank money was privately
issued bank notes. These were issued by banks at par, but when used at
some distance from the issuing bank, they were accepted only at a discount
(see, for example, Gorton 1996, 1999). This early period of banking in the
United States was plagued with difficulties, and various solutions were
proposed. For the sake of brevity, we start our examination with the Panic
of 1837.
23
The Panic of 1837 disclosed the defects of the New York Safety Fund
System and ushered in that state’s Free Banking Act of 1838.
24 The Safety
Fund had been established in New York in 1829 as an insurance system.
Each member bank was required to make periodic contributions, as a per-
centage of its capital, to a fund for the payment of the debts of any insolvent
member after its own assets had been exhausted. Of course, the problem
was that the bank had to be insolvent in order for claims to be made on
the fund, but at least in principle the note holders would not suffer losses.
The Panic of 1837 was the ﬁrst test of the Safety Fund. Banks suspended
convertibility of notes and deposits into specie in May of that year. Later
that year came the ﬁrst calls on the Safety Fund. In the end, the fund was
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23. For a history of U.S. banking before this period, see, among others, Knox (1900).
24. We focus here on New York, which was the most important state in this history in
many ways. For more general treatments, see, for example, Dewey (1910), Golembe (1960),
and Rockoff (1974).
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banks, even with an extra tax on member banks. The fund was basically
abandoned: although it continued for chartered banks until 1866, very few
banks participated.
New York’s Free Banking Act, imitated by many (but not all) other
states, introduced a fundamental idea into the design of banking: the use of
explicit and mostly transparent collateral to back the issuance of private
money.
25 Free banking laws had the following standard features: entry was
relatively easy, requiring no special state legislation (previously a state
banking charter had required a speciﬁc act of the legislature); free banks
were required to post eligible state bonds with the state auditor as collateral
for notes issued (some states allowed federal bonds also); free banks were
required to pay specie on demand or would (after a grace period) forfeit their
charter; free banks were organized as limited liability ﬁrms. Our concern is
with the bond collateral. The eligible bonds were publicly known, and what
bonds were posted by each bank was also known. The state auditor kept
the bank’s printing plates and printed the notes.
The bond backing system worked in principle, but in practice the 
collateral—the state bonds—was not riskless. Arthur Rolnick and Warren
Weber (1984) show that free banks failed when the value of the bonds they
posted as collateral fell. The Panic of 1857, which largely involved another
bank liability that had grown enormously, namely, demand deposits, revealed
the deﬁciencies of a system that backed note issuance with bank bonds.
The use of bond collateral for note issuance under the free banking laws
was the basis for the most successful ﬁnancial legislation in U.S. history,
the National Bank Acts. According to Andrew Davis (1910, p. 7), “The
success of [free banking] suggested that a uniform national currency might
in the same way be provided through the emissions of special associa-
tions [national banks], which should secure their notes by the pledge of
government securities.” Partly as a way of ﬁnancing the Civil War, Congress
passed the National Bank Acts in 1863 and 1864 to create a uniform
federal currency. National bank notes were liabilities of a new category of
banks, called “national banks.” They could issue notes upon depositing
U.S. Treasury securities with the federal government equal in face value
to 111 percent (later reduced to 100 percent) of the value of notes issued.
After the Panic of 1873, banks were further required to make deposits into
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25. Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin adopted free banking
laws before the Civil War.
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(1963, p. 21) summarized, “Though national bank notes were nominally
liabilities of the banks that issued them, in effect they were indirect liabilities
of the federal government thanks to both the required government bond
security and the conditions for their redemption.” National bank notes cir-
culated at par, and there were none of the problems that had plagued the
antebellum period. But although these notes remained safe, panics did occur
during the national banking period, in 1873, 1884, 1893, 1907, and 1914.
It was these panics, centered on demand deposits rather than bank notes,
that eventually led to the creation of federal deposit insurance through
the FDIC.
Deposit insurance has a long history in the United States, dating back
to the New York Safety Fund System brieﬂy discussed above. Before the
FDIC was created, there were numerous state-organized insurance schemes.
Before the Civil War, in addition to New York, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Ohio, and Vermont organized such systems. These had different designs,
and whereas some can be described as successful (Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio),
others were not. Although deposits were not insured under the national
banking system, the National Bank Acts were followed by a halt to state
insurance programs for almost 50 years. After the Panic of 1907, however,
some states again introduced deposit insurance programs, notably Okla-
homa, which was then followed by a number of other states, including
Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and
Washington. All collapsed during the 1920s, when agricultural prices fell
(see Golembe 1960, Calomiris 1989, 1990).
During the national banking era, private bank clearinghouses in various
cities undertook the role of monitoring banks, and in the Panics of 1893 and
1907 they provided a kind of insurance. When suspension of convertibility
occurred, organized by the clearinghouse, the clearinghouses would not
exchange currency for checks. But they did issue clearinghouse loan
certiﬁcates, in small denominations that could be used as money, in both
1893 and 1907. These certiﬁcates were the joint liability of all members of
that clearinghouse that were located in its city. Thus, claims on an individual
bank that might be insolvent were replaced with claims on the group of banks
(see Gorton and Mullineaux 1987, Gorton 1985).
To summarize, after the Civil War, collateral backing by speciﬁed eligi-
ble bonds under the National Bank Acts solved the problems with bank
notes but left demand deposits vulnerable to panic. The problem of demand
deposit panics was solved only in 1934 with the creation of federal deposit
insurance.
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Our proposals are based on two themes developed in the paper:
—An important cause of the recent panic was that seemingly safe instru-
ments like MMMF shares and triple-A-rated securitized bonds suddenly
seemed unsafe. New regulation should seek to make it clear, through
either insurance or collateral, which instruments are truly safe and which
are not.
—The rise of shadow banking was facilitated by a demand-driven
expansion in the bankruptcy safe harbor for repos. This safe harbor has
real value to market participants and can be used to bring repos under the
regulatory umbrella.
We use these themes to develop our speciﬁc proposals for MMMFs,
securitization, and repos.
IV.A. MMMFs: Narrow Savings Banks or Floating Net Asset Values
The central regulatory problem for MMMFs is simple: MMMFs com-
pete in the same space as depository banks, but differ from them in provid-
ing an implicit promise to investors that they will never lose money. This
promise, for which the MMMFs do not have to pay, was made explicit by
the government in the recent crisis. This problem is well understood and
has been discussed for many years by academics and regulators. To solve it,
we adopt the speciﬁc proposal of the Group of Thirty (2009), which is concise
enough that we quote it in full:
a. Money market mutual funds wishing to continue to offer bank-like services, such as
transaction account services, withdrawals on demand at par, and assurances of maintaining
a stable net asset value (NAV) at par should be required to reorganize as special-purpose
banks, with appropriate prudential regulation and supervision, government insurance, and
access to central bank lender-of-last-resort facilities.
b. Those institutions remaining as money market mutual funds should only offer a
conservative investment option with modest upside potential at relatively low risk. The
vehicles should be clearly differentiated from federally insured instruments offered by
banks, such as money market deposit funds, with no explicit or implicit assurances to
investors that funds can be withdrawn on demand at a stable NAV. Money market mutual
funds should not be permitted to use amortized cost pricing, with the implication that they
carry a ﬂuctuating NAV rather than one that is pegged at US$1.00 per share.
The logic of this proposal—the elimination of “free” insurance for
MMMFs—seems powerful. So why has it not been adopted? One reason
is that the MMMF industry is reluctant to part with free insurance, and a
$4 trillion industry can make for a powerful lobby. A second reason is that
2010 still seems a dangerous time to be disrupting such a large short-term
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believe that any changes can be decided now and implemented after the
credit markets have recovered.
Our only tweak on the Group of Thirty proposal is that we call their
special-purpose banks “narrow savings banks,” or NSBs. We do this to
underline the analogy to our “narrow funding banks” (NFBs) for securiti-
zation, as described in the next subsection.
IV.B. Securitization: Narrow Funding Banks
The basic idea of NFBs is to bring securitization under the regulatory
umbrella. What may seem radical at ﬁrst glance becomes less so when it is
recognized that securitization is just banking by another name, and that
it makes sense to regulate similar functions with similar rules. Indeed, the
logic is the same as that for the creation of NSBs in place of MMMFs.
NFBs would be genuine banks with charters, capital requirements, periodic
examinations, and access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Under
the proposal, all securitized products must be sold to NFBs; no other entity
would be allowed to buy ABSs. (NFBs could also buy other high-grade
assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities.) NFBs would be new entities
located between securitizations and ﬁnal investors. Instead of buying ABSs,
ﬁnal investors would buy the liabilities of NFBs.
An NFB regulator would design and monitor the criteria for NFB
portfolios. It would determine what classes of ABSs are eligible for pur-
chase by NFBs and would determine the criteria governing the allowed
proportions of different asset classes in the portfolio and the proportions
of assets of different ratings. With these rules, the regulator would be
setting collateral requirements for NFBs in the same way that the National
Bank Acts set collateral requirements for bank notes in the 19th century,
and in the same way that bank regulators set capital requirements in the
21st century.
Note that under the Group of Thirty’s proposal, the government would
offer explicit government insurance for what we are calling NSBs, just as
it does today for depository banks. Such insurance would be workable for
NSBs because all holdings of these banks would have the same seniority,
and the entire portfolio would be required to have low risk. Securitization is
different. Because ABSs typically have multiple tranches, we do not believe
that insurance would be a practical solution: the subordinated components
would have some risk and could not be insured, and insurance on the senior
components would exacerbate the information problems in the subordinated
components. It would defeat the purpose of our proposed regulatory structure
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adverse selection. Thus, we have proposed collateralization combined with
supervision, but we acknowledge that this combination cannot provide the
same 100 percent protection as government insurance. For that reason
NFB liabilities can never be considered perfect substitutes for government
debt, and the Federal Reserve would need to ensure a sufﬁcient supply of
non-NFB collateral. We return to this important point in section V.
Our proposal does place new burdens on the regulatory system. The
NFB regulator would have to monitor NFB portfolios and perhaps take
corrective action. Would it be up to the task? We believe that this task is no
different from that faced by traditional bank regulators. The NFB regulator
would need to assess the risks of each NFB’s activities and evaluate the
amount of capital it needed. If the regulatory system is incapable of perform-
ing this activity for NFBs, it will be equally challenged if these activities
remain on the balance sheets of traditional banks.
NFBs would be a different category of bank because their activities
would be so narrowly circumscribed; they would be rules-driven, trans-
parent, stand-alone, newly capitalized entities that could buy only ABSs
and other low-risk securities and issue liabilities. They would not be allowed
to take deposits, make loans, engage in proprietary trading, or trade deriv-
atives. These limitations would result in a much lower risk proﬁle than tra-
ditional banks have, with lower earnings volatility and a much lower return
on equity.
26
NFBs can be viewed as regulated collateral creators or repo banks. They
would be allowed to fund themselves through repos. They could engage
in repo transactions with private depositors, as could other entities as dis-
cussed below. Since all ABSs would have to be sold to NFBs, NFBs would
subsume the function of ABCP conduits, SIVs, and related limited-ﬁnance
companies. These other entities could become NFBs but would have to
sever ties with bank sponsors and meet the other NFB requirements. NFBs
would therefore complement traditional banks’ origination and securitiza-
tion activities. As in the precrisis economy, traditional banks could fund
286 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
26. For greater concreteness we provide an abbreviated sample term sheet indicating
the main features of a NFB at the Brookings Papers website. As the sample term sheet
indicates, if capital or other triggers are hit, the NFB would automatically go into a 
limited, “no growth mode,” and if it does not recover, it would automatically go into
wind-down, in a process we call “natural amortization.” This would be a form of living
will governing all the points of transition between operating states. There would be no
bailouts of NFBs.
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chased by NFBs.
IV.C. Repos: Licenses, Eligible Collateral, and Minimum Haircuts
There are two sides to a repo contract: the depositor, who provides cash
to the bank in exchange for interest and receives collateral (the transaction
is a “reverse repo” from the depositor’s perspective), and the bank, which
receives the money and initially holds the bonds used as collateral. In the
crisis the problem was that the housing price shock caused securitized
products to become information-sensitive, leading to withdrawals from the
repo market, which in turn forced banks to liquidate collateral. This would
suggest that we focus our proposals for new regulation on the banks, 
the providers of collateral, rather than on the depositors. Indeed, we want
to provide a safe, deposit-like account for the bulk of repo depositors. The
problem is that, as discussed above, repos have many other uses as well,
including the short selling of bonds for hedging purposes and the conducting
of arbitrage to keep derivative prices in line with prices on the underlying
assets. So any regulation of repos must make them safe for depositors while
at the same time allowing for these other uses. This is the basis for our repo
proposal, which distinguishes the treatment of banks from that of other
entities that can use repos:
—Banks (NFBs, NSBs, and commercial banks) would be allowed to
engage in repo ﬁnancing, that is, the activity of borrowing money, paying
interest, and providing collateral.
—Nonbank entities would also be allowed to engage in repos, but only
with a license, and would face other constraints as discussed below.
—Eligible collateral for banks in repo transactions would be restricted
to U.S. Treasury securities, liabilities of NFBs, and such other asset classes
as the regulator deems appropriate.
—Eligible collateral for nonbank entities could be any type of security,
but the transaction would be subject to minimum haircuts and position
limits as speciﬁed below.
—Minimum haircuts would be required on all collateral used in repos
and could be speciﬁc to the two parties and the collateral offered.
—Position limits would be set for nonbank entities, in terms of gross
notional amounts issued or held, as a function of ﬁrm size and the collateral
used.
—Rehypothecation would be limited automatically by the minimum
haircuts.
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approve for their portfolios; this would include approved ABSs, government
bonds, and possibly the debt of government-sponsored entities. As with the
regulations on NFBs, the rules for eligible collateral would be analogous to
19th-century rules for collateral on bank notes.
Because of position limits and possibly higher minimum haircuts, repos
outside of banks would be constrained. The advantage thus conferred on
being a bank would keep this type of money creation mostly within the
regulated sector but would not prevent the use of repos for a broader range
of purposes other than as a deposit.
NFBs would not be required to ﬁnance all, or even part, of their port-
folios using repos. Indeed, we would expect that NFBs would issue some
longer-term debt, for purchase by institutional investors, and use some repo
ﬁnancing as well, with the relative proportions determined by supply and
demand.
Nonbank licensed entities allowed to engage in repos would include,
for example, hedge funds, which have usually financed themselves in
the repo market. In doing so they would be borrowing against securities
posted as collateral; they would not act as repo depositors. On the other
side of the transaction would be a bank or other entity lending against
the collateral and possibly borrowing from a third entity against this same
collateral.
If none of these three entities is a bank, position limits with regard to
total repos outstanding (regardless of direction) on each of the three entities
would constrain this type of transaction. Haircuts would depend on the
identities of the parties to a repo, in a bilateral repo, and on the type of
collateral. Minimum haircuts may not be binding on some transactions,
but they are likely to be meaningful because of the restriction to eligible
collateral. Minimum haircuts would not prevent all runs; they would, how-
ever, limit leverage and reduce rehypothecation.
In summary, our proposed rules would create two types of allowable
repo. The ﬁrst type, offered by commercial banks and NFBs, would cap-
ture the monetary function of repos and would be regulated in a manner
analogous to the regulation of bank notes (with regard to collateral) in
the 19th century and depository institutions in the 21st (using minimum
haircuts as an analogue to capital requirements). The second type could
be offered by any institution with a license and would be regulated so 
as to be more expensive than the first. Policymakers and the judiciary
could prevent a third type, totally unregulated repos, by making clear that
only the first two types receive the special bankruptcy protections. The
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them only to regulated repos, leakage from the regulated system could
be minimized.
V. Discussion
Repos and securitization should be regulated because they are, in effect,
new forms of banking, but with the same vulnerability as other forms of
bank-created money. Like previous reforms of banking, our proposals seek
to preserve banking and bank-created money but eliminate bank runs. Our
proposals are aimed at creating a sufﬁcient amount of high-quality collateral
that can be used safely in repo transactions. NFBs would be overseen to
ensure the creation of safe collateral, and repos would mostly be restricted
to banks. Our proposals are built on the idea that these activities are efﬁ-
cient, in part because of the safe harbor from bankruptcy, the maintenance
of which is the incentive for agents to abide by the proposed rules.
As we showed in section III, the vulnerability of bank-created money to
banking panics has a long history, and the history of attempts to eliminate
this problem is almost as long. Collateralization has been one successful
approach. Off-balance-sheet banking has become the major source of col-
lateral and needs to be overseen. We propose that NFBs become the enti-
ties that transform ABSs into government-overseen collateral. Repos then
can be backed by this high-quality collateral.
In this paper we have not provided all the details necessary for deter-
mining acceptable collateral or for setting minimum haircuts. These details
would need to be worked out in conjunction with rules for bank capital,
with which they would be closely intertwined. Although it is clear that
setting rules for shadow banking would make new demands on regulators,
these demands would be analogous to those that arise when setting rules
for banks. Whether risks are retained on the balance sheet or allowed to go
off the balance sheet, there is no escaping the need for regulators to evalu-
ate these risks. We do not see any pure private sector solutions to ensure
the safety of the banking system, and so the role of regulators will remain
essential. If today’s regulators are found not to be up to the task, they
should be better trained and better paid. If instead the task is simply impos-
sible, then either we are destined to have more crises, or we will be forced
to live with a greatly constrained ﬁnancial system.
Space constraints prevent us from discussing a number of important
related issues, but we will close by briefly focusing on two. The first is
whether our proposals would lead to a shortage of suitable collateral, as
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U.S. Treasury securities outstanding is insufficient for use as collateral,
the private sector will have an incentive to try to create substitutes, such as
triple-A-rated bonds. The problem is that the substitutes cannot always
be information-insensitive. In 2005 the idea of the U.S. Treasury provid-
ing a backstop facility, a “securities lender of last resort,” was broached
(see Garbade and Kambhu 2005, U.S. Treasury 2005). Our view is that such
a facility might need to be available on a regular basis, but that it should be
run by the Federal Reserve, which might also need to issue its own securi-
ties to be used exclusively as repo collateral. The Federal Reserve needs to
focus more carefully on the provision (and measurement) of liquidity, and
it is the job of the Fed to provide collateral.
A second issue concerns monetary policy generally. Because no mea-
sure presently exists of the whole of the repo market, we do not know its
full size or the extent of rehypothecation. It seems that U.S. Treasury secu-
rities are extensively rehypothecated (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
2010) and therefore should be viewed as money. This means that open
market operations are simply exchanging one kind of money for another,
rather than exchanging money for “bonds.” Open market operations may
need to be rethought.
APPENDIX
Glossary of Shadow Banking Terms
Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP): Short-term debt issued by 
a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle, or conduit, which uses 
the proceeds to purchase asset-backed securities. Such vehicles are set
up by a bank or other sponsor but owned and actively managed by a man-
agement company legally separate from the sponsor. See Fitch Ratings
(2001).
Asset-backed security (ABS): A bond backed by the cash flows from
a pool of speciﬁed assets in a special purpose vehicle rather than by the
general credit of a corporation or other entity. The asset pool may contain
residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, auto loans, credit card
receivables, student loans, aircraft leases, royalty payments, or any of a
variety of other types of asset.
Collateralized debt obligation (CDO): An instrument issued by a special
purpose vehicle that buys a portfolio of fixed-income assets, financing
the purchase by issuing CDOs in tranches, whose risk ranges from low
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double-A to Ba/BB), to high (equity tranches, unrated).
Rehypothecation: In the repo context, the right to freely use the bonds
received as collateral for other purposes.
Narrow funding bank (NFB): A proposed new type of bank that may
buy only asset-backed securities and certain other high-quality assets, 
as approved by a regulator. The regulator sets the portfolio criteria with
respect to the proportions of asset types and their ratings. NFBs would be
able to issue any nondeposit liability and would have access to the discount
window but could not engage in other activities. As regulated banks, NFBs
would have charters, capital requirements, and regulatory examinations.
Narrow savings bank (NSB): A proposed new type of insured deposi-
tory institution into which existing MMMFs seeking deposit insurance
protection could be transformed. As insured entities, NSBs would have
charters, capital requirements, and regulatory examinations.
Sale-and-repurchase agreement (repo): A contract in which an investor
places money with a bank or other entity for a short period and receives
(and takes physical possession of) collateral valued at market prices, as well
as interest. The bank or other entity simultaneously agrees to repurchase
the collateral at a speciﬁed price at the end of the contract. From the per-
spective of the bank, the transaction is a “repo,” and from the perspective
of the depositor, the same transaction is a “reverse repo.”
Securitization: The process of ﬁnancing a portfolio of loans by segre-
gating speciﬁed cash ﬂows from those loans and selling securities in the
capital markets that are speciﬁcally linked to those ﬂows. The ﬁrm origi-
nating the loans (the “sponsor”) sets up a special purpose vehicle to which
it then sells the speciﬁed cash ﬂows, and which issues the (rated) linked
securities. The sponsor continues to service the cash ﬂows; that is, it makes
sure that the cash ﬂows are arriving and performs certain other tasks asso-
ciated with traditional lending.
Special purpose vehicle (SPV): An SPV (also called a special purpose
entity, SPE) is a legal entity set up for a specific, limited purpose by a
sponsoring ﬁrm. An SPV can take the form of a corporation, trust, partner-
ship, or limited liability company, but it is not an operating company in the
usual sense. It has no employees or physical location and is strictly bound
by a set of rules so that it can only carry out some speciﬁc purpose or cir-
cumscribed transaction, or a series of such transactions. An essential feature
of an SPV is that it is “bankruptcy remote,” that is, incapable of becoming
legally bankrupt and unaffected by the bankruptcy of its sponsor. See Gorton
and Souleles (2006).
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by seniority and sold separately from other portions; for example, a triple-
A-rated tranche is more senior than a triple-B-rated tranche of the same
portfolio.
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COMMENT BY
ANDREI SHLEIFER This fascinating paper by Gary Gorton and
Andrew Metrick provides an extremely useful overview of the shadow
banking system, puts it into historical perspective, explains how it is
responsible for the ﬁnancial crisis, and makes a proposal for how to ﬁx it.
Yet the paper is much more than an overview, and in some crucial ways it
provides a highly distinctive perspective. This perspective consists of four
propositions.
First, starting with the widely accepted notion that the deﬁning feature
of the shadow banking system is securitization, the paper goes on to
argue that the essential aspect, indeed the raison d’être, of securitization is
maturity transformation, that is, the transformation of long-term ﬁnancial
instruments, such as mortgages, into short-term securities, such as repos
and commercial paper. Securitization became so massive, in the authors’
view, not so much to create allegedly safe long-term securities through
diversiﬁcation and the tranching of risky debt, as many economists have
argued, but rather to use these securities to provide fodder for short-term
ﬁnance. Long-term securities, in this view, served mainly as collateral for
short-term borrowing instruments. It is the demand for short-term securi-
ties from money market mutual funds and other short-term investors that
made securitization possible.
Second, the paper argues that the abrupt withdrawal of short-term
ﬁnance was responsible for the ﬁnancial crisis. Because investors in short-
term securities expected complete safety, the realization that these securi-
ties might be at risk caused them to withdraw ﬁnancing on very short
notice. This withdrawal took the form of rapidly rising haircuts on repo
transactions or even runs. When the dealer banks that engineered the matu-
rity transformation faced this withdrawal of short-term ﬁnance, they had to
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12367-05b_Gorton comments-rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 298liquidate the positions they had ﬁnanced with short-term debt, triggering
massive losses, declines in their balance sheets, and reductions in their
ability to ﬁnance either their existing holdings or other investments.
Third, among the several different forms of short-term finance asso-
ciated with the maturity transformation, the real culprit for the increase
in financial fragility, in the authors’ view, is the repo. Repo financing of
asset-backed securities (ABS) holdings was particularly aggressive
because by law repos are bankruptcy remote: the parties extending such
collateralized finance do not become part of the bankruptcy estate
should the borrower default. Such regulatory protection of repo finance,
Gorton and Metrick maintain, caused it to grow to gigantic levels. Its
withdrawal, or the sharp increase in its cost, is therefore primarily
responsible for the crisis.
Fourth, in the light of the above three points, the paper argues that the
route to ﬁnancial stability is to regulate repo ﬁnancing of ABS holdings.
This would be done by, ﬁrst, forcing all ABSs to be rated by a government-
regulated agency and sold to specialized narrow banks; second, restricting
the quantity of ABSs that can be ﬁnanced with repos and the terms of that
ﬁnancing; and third, more closely regulating the lenders in the repo mar-
ket, particularly the money market mutual funds.
As I explain below, all four of these distinctive propositions are, to
varying degrees, controversial. I am not suggesting that I know that they
are wrong. Rather, my goal is to point out that information is extremely
limited even today about exactly who were the various buyers of ABSs,
what was the extent of maturity transformation, and even what were the
main sources of ﬁnancial fragility. We do know by now that the Federal
Reserve did not collect the information that would today, 2 years later—let
alone in 2008—enable us to answer these questions with conﬁdence. We
also know that neither the Federal Reserve nor many of the major market
participants, such as AIG and Citibank, understood the vulnerability of
shadow banking at the time of the crisis. What really happened is still
largely a matter of guesswork. It may well turn out that Gorton and Met-
rick’s assessments are correct, and then in retrospect they will look like
geniuses, but my intention is to identify the areas of extreme uncertainty in
our knowledge today.
To begin, the fundamental assumption of the Gorton and Metrick narra-
tive is that securitization was, to a ﬁrst approximation, all about providing
fodder for short-term riskless ﬁnance. For this to be the case, it must be
that nearly all ABSs, or at least the lion’s share, were ﬁnanced short-term
by their holders. It is surely the case that a good deal of ABSs went into
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selves, and in these instances, short-term ﬁnance was common. Yet at
least some, and possibly a good part, of ABSs were acquired by pension
funds, insurance companies, and even government-sponsored enterprises.
For those buyers, short-term ﬁnancing was probably much less important.
The reason this observation is of some consequence is that Gorton and
Metrick’s regulatory proposal would require that all ABSs be maturity
transformed, which presumably would prevent their being sold to investors
in long-term securities. I am far from certain that this would be desirable.
Gorton and Metrick’s second assumption is that the withdrawal of this
short-term ﬁnance was responsible for the crisis. This assumption seems
plausible, since sharp reductions in short-term ﬁnancing did occur around
the time of Lehman Brothers’ failure, but even here there are some issues.
First, the reductions in short-term ﬁnancing of long-term positions in
ABSs began in the summer of 2007, as the market for asset-based com-
mercial paper dried up. This withdrawal of short-term ﬁnancing was coun-
tered by several liquidity interventions from the Federal Reserve, which
successfully delayed the collapse of the markets until the fall of 2008.
Second, and more important, it is far from clear whether the with-
drawal of short-term financing in August and September 2008 actually
precipitated the collapse or was, alternatively, its consequence. After all,
bad news about both housing and commercial real estate was coming
into the market throughout 2008, making it increasingly clear that several
of the major ﬁnancial institutions were insolvent. Was the withdrawal of
short-term ﬁnance a response to this realization of insolvency, or did it
actually precipitate the insolvency? Following Douglas Diamond and
Philip Dybvig (1983), economists often use the term “run” to describe a
multiple-equilibrium situation, in which a bad equilibrium with a run can
occur despite solid fundamentals. Such a run does not seem to be a good
description of what happened to Lehman and other banks in 2008. The
withdrawal of short-term ﬁnance surely undermined bank balance sheets,
but it seems to me at least as plausible that this withdrawal was a response
to an already incurable situation rather than its cause. And if that is the
case, regulating short-term finance might not be as high a priority as
Gorton and Metrick indicate.
Gorton and Metrick’s third assumption, namely, that repo ﬁnancing of
ABSs was the source of instability in the ﬁnancial system, is the most con-
troversial. Dealer banks relied on a variety of short-term ﬁnancing mecha-
nisms, including not only repo but also prime brokerage and commercial
paper. Prime brokerage enabled dealer banks to use the assets they held on
300 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
12367-05b_Gorton comments-rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 300COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 301
behalf of their brokerage clients as collateral for their own borrowing.
The withdrawal of those accounts was apparently extremely costly to Bear
Stearns and perhaps other dealer banks. Commercial paper is, of course,
the most traditional form of short-term ﬁnancing and was hugely important
in the years before the crisis. Indeed, the SIVs, which were the institutions
most centrally involved in the maturity transformation, ﬁnanced them-
selves with commercial paper, and not with repos. My ﬁgure 1, taken from
Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin (2010), shows outstanding volumes of
repos and commercial paper around the time of the crisis. The two series
show extremely similar patterns of extraordinary growth before the crisis,
followed by a rapid collapse. How do Gorton and Metrick know that, even
assuming that the withdrawal of short-term ﬁnance in August and Septem-
ber 2008 was at the heart of the crisis, it was repos rather than commercial
paper that tipped the balance? Lehman, after all, defaulted on its commer-
cial paper. This issue is critical since commercial paper is not an innova-
tion but a very old ﬁnancial instrument (the Federal Reserve’s 1913 charter
gives it responsibility for that market), and in particular it does not enjoy
the legal advantages with respect to bankruptcy that repos do. It would
seem a bit audacious to lay the blame on repos’ bankruptcy remoteness
















Source: Adrian and Shin (2010). 
July 4, 1994 = 1.0
2007
Figure 1. Overnight Repos and Commercial Paper of Financial Institutions
Outstanding, 1994–2009
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broke the camel’s back. Most ﬁxed-income repo ﬁnancing uses government
or agency bonds as collateral. ABSs are used as collateral in only a rela-
tively small share of the repo market, and it seems highly doubtful to me
that repo ﬁnancing of their own ABS holdings was important for dealer
banks. There is no evidence that the repo market in government or agency
paper malfunctioned badly during the crisis. Moreover, many dealer banks
are just intermediaries in repo ﬁnancing: they borrow securities from hedge
funds and provide them with short-term ﬁnancing, and then lend these secu-
rities on to cash-rich, often foreign, banks and borrow cash from them. So
long as the dealer banks can count on getting the hedge funds to cough up
additional cash when the haircuts on loans rise, the situation is stable. To
elevate ABS repos to the prominence in the crisis that Gorton and Metrick
wish to assign to it, they need to provide a good deal more evidence.
These reservations bring me to their policy proposal, which of course
would require a major regulatory overhaul of the whole shadow banking
system. Let me not focus on the question of whether, if the underlying
assumptions of the Gorton and Metrick analysis are correct, their pro-
posal would be a good idea. I understand that the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York considered a similar proposal a while ago and decided
against it because it was impractical. Let me instead come back to the
three assumptions.
First, if implemented, the proposal to allow only narrow funding banks
to purchase ABSs would deprive buyers of ABSs not interested in short-
term instruments of access to these securities. If, as the authors believe,
securitization reduces the cost of capital for desirable investment projects,
and if much of the demand comes from investors uninterested in short-
term ﬁnance of their positions, shutting off this demand might not promote
efﬁciency.
Second, if short-term ﬁnance was not the culprit during this crisis, but
instead the problem was, for example, the failure of ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries to understand the risks of the securities they were holding, it is not
clear how the proposal addresses the central problem. Would the world be
a safer place if dealer banks maintained large holdings of ABSs, or pro-
vided guarantees to SIVs, without relying on short-term ﬁnance? Presum-
ably, when these institutions are subject to capital requirements and other
regulations, they still face huge pressure to shrink their balance sheets
when they suffer losses.
Third, and perhaps most important, if ABS repos do occupy the central
position in the crisis to which Gorton and Metrick have elevated them,
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just as fragile as it was before. If the government raises the cost of one
form of short-term ﬁnancing and does nothing else, presumably the dealer
banks will turn to other forms. I agree wholeheartedly with Gorton and
Metrick that the existing ﬁnancial infrastructure failed miserably during
the crisis, but I would wish to have a bit more conﬁdence that we are
wrecking and replacing the parts of it that are actually rotten rather than the
ones that are not.
In this regard, let me make one ﬁnal point, to which I have already
alluded. It seems to me that the fundamental cause of the ﬁnancial crisis is
that market participants, as well as the regulators, did not understand the
risks inherent in ABSs and other new types of securities. They did not
expect that home prices could fall so much and so fast and in so many places
at once. They did not understand correlations in home prices and defaults.
They used incorrect models. It is not just the ratings agencies that messed
things up, but the whole market misunderstood the risks, as is clear from
the fact that the price of risk was extremely low in the summer of 2007 and
did not rise much in the months after that.
As long as market participants do not understand the risks of the securi-
ties they are buying, whether these securities are ABSs or prime money
market fund shares or something that will be invented in the future, and see
proﬁt opportunities in places where there are none, the ﬁnancial system
will adjust to meet their demand (see Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny
2010). One implication of this is the standard point that providing the
intermediaries with bigger cushions of capital and liquidity is desirable.
But perhaps a deeper point is that in such environments where important
risks are misunderstood, shutting down one mechanism whereby investors
and intermediaries pursue their proﬁts is unlikely to work. They will try to
realize their dreams through other instruments instead. Regulating a partic-
ular instrument, or a particular segment of the market, to solve a more fun-
damental problem is highly unlikely to work.
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COMMENT BY
DANIEL K. TARULLO Broadly speaking, threats to ﬁnancial stability
can arise in two ways: ﬁrst, through the rapid deterioration or failure of a
large institution with leverage sufficient to have widespread knock-on
effects, and second, through the breakdown of a signiﬁcant market in which
large numbers of leveraged actors depend upon similar sources of liquidity
and, importantly, backup liquidity in periods of stress. These two sources of
systemic risk can be, and usually are, related. In fact, the severity of the
recent crisis might be explained as an explosive combination of the two.
But the different origins of risk call for different or, perhaps more precisely,
complementary, policy responses.
1
To date, reform in ﬁnancial regulation and supervision has focused
mainly on large regulated institutions. Three examples are the just-
announced Basel III capital rules, much of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the
Federal Reserve’s revamping of its supervision of large holding compa-
nies. Of course, attention has also been paid to the second source of sys-
temic risk, notably in Dodd-Frank’s provisions for prudential supervision
of payments, clearing, and settlement systems. But more will need to be
done in this area, particularly as new constraints applicable to large regu-
lated institutions push more activity into the unregulated sector.
This paper by Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick ﬁts squarely within
this enterprise. It builds on two important insights from work that Gorton
was pursuing well before the ﬁnancial crisis began. The ﬁrst was that the
enormous growth of the shadow banking system generally, and the repur-
chase agreement, or “repo,” market speciﬁcally, depended on the engineer-
ing of triple-A-rated securities that led participants to believe they did not
need to inquire into the soundness of the underlying collateral. This ﬁnan-
cial engineering largely succeeded in insulating participants from idiosyn-
cratic risk. But when the value of whole classes of the underlying collateral
was drawn into serious question, initially by the collapse of the subprime
housing market, participants’ lack of information about the collateral they
held led to a shattering of conﬁdence in all the collateral.
In the absence of the regulation and government backstop that have
applied to the traditional banking system since the Depression, a run on
assets in the entire repo market ensued. The resulting forced sale of assets
into an illiquid market turned many illiquid institutions into insolvent ones.
1. The views presented here are my own and not necessarily those of other members
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market 
Committee. Tom King and Michael Palumbo of the Board staff contributed to these remarks.
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available for nonagency residential mortgage-backed securities, commer-
cial mortgage-backed securities, high-yield corporate bonds, and other
instruments backed by assets with any degree of risk remains substantially
below its pre-September 2008 levels.
The second insight of Gorton’s on which this paper builds is the impor-
tance of statutory franchise value for the business model viability of at least
some kinds of regulated ﬁnancial entities. Where competition from unregu-
lated entities is permitted, whether explicitly or de facto, capital and other
requirements imposed on regulated ﬁrms may shrink margins enough to
make them unattractive to investors. The result, as in the past, will be some
combination of regulatory arbitrage, assumption of higher risk in permitted
activities, and exit from the industry. Each of these outcomes at least poten-
tially undermines the original motivation for the regulation.
Gorton and Metrick provide a concrete, although rather skeletal, pro-
posal to remedy the information problem in the repo market through cre-
ation of statutory franchise value for what they call narrow funding banks
(NFBs). These banks would be “narrow” in that their only assets would be
asset-backed securities (ABSs) and very high quality instruments such
as Treasury securities. They would, it appears, make their money from the
income streams associated with the ABSs. They would raise the funds to
purchase ABSs through debt issuance and, most signiﬁcantly for the pro-
posal, the repo market, in which the collateral offered would be liabilities
of the NFBs. The government would regulate the NFBs directly, as it does
all banks, but also by setting requirements for the ABSs that could be
bought by the NFBs. This regulation is intended to provide market conﬁ-
dence in the liabilities of the NFBs, which would be further buttressed by
NFB access to the discount window.
A key feature of the proposal is that, by law, only NFBs could buy secu-
ritized assets. The consequent franchise value would compensate NFBs for
the costs they incur because they can hold only high-quality securities, are
subject to supervision and prudential requirements, and have to operate in
a highly transparent fashion. In essence, ABS-backed repo funding would
be limited to NFBs.
The ﬁrst two questions I would pose about this creative policy proposal
are the most basic: What problem is it supposed to solve, and how does
the breadth of the remedy align with that problem? Given their analysis of
the breakdown of the repo market, Gorton and Metrick’s answer might be
self-evident: Their proposal aims to solve the information problems that
increased the risk from maturity transformation associated with ABS repo
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funding. This, of course, is not a solution for the entire shadow banking
system, although an effective plan for reforming the ABS repo market
would be a major accomplishment in itself.
2
But the solution that Gorton and Metrick propose to this problem would
signiﬁcantly restrict all asset-backed securitization. Although it is obvious
that too much credit was created through ABSs and associated instruments
in the years preceding the crisis, it seems at least reasonable to question
whether the best policy response is this dramatic a change in the regulatory
environment. One wonders, for example, if it is desirable to forbid anyone
but NFBs from buying ABSs, particularly if there are investors interested in
holding these assets regardless of their utility in repo arrangements. The
severe problems now associated with ABSs began with assets held by mis-
matched entities like structured investment vehicles or ﬁnancial institutions
engaged in capital arbitrage under Basel II, not those held by end investors.
A variant on this initial question is how much the legal environment for
securitization should be changed in order to provide a source of stable
short-term liquidity in wholesale funding markets. Limiting securitization
purchases to NFBs would surely result in some tailoring of ABSs to the
business models of NFBs, an outcome that might not be identical to a secu-
ritization market tailored to the funding needs of lenders providing credit 
to businesses and consumers. Also, as I will explain later, Gorton and 
Metrick’s proposal would require nontrivial changes in bank regulatory
policy, as well as the signiﬁcant extension of discount window access to a
new kind of institution. All this would be in pursuit of a mechanism for gen-
erating large amounts of liquidity. A cost-beneﬁt discussion is probably
needed at the outset, with careful speciﬁcation of the beneﬁts of the repo
market that the authors are trying to save, weighed against the likely impact
on, among other things, the securitization market and the regulatory system.
A second set of questions concerns how the NFBs would operate in
practice. As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that policymakers may
ﬁnd the proposal to have a certain binary quality. That is, it would struc-
turally change the entire securitization market and a large portion of the
repo market essentially overnight. In effect, Gorton and Metrick put all
securitization eggs into one basket. If the new system worked well, the
benefits presumably would be significant, and perhaps quickly realized.
Indeed, the new system might succeed in helping to restart, on a sounder
basis, various ABS submarkets that remain largely dormant 3 years after
2. For a survey of the entire shadow banking system, see Pozsar and others (2010).
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the crisis began to unfold.3 If, on the other hand, the new system encoun-
tered major difﬁculties, there might be materially reduced adaptive capac-
ity in other ﬁnancial actors, possibly for a considerable period.
One obvious source of difﬁculty is the possibility, well recognized by
Gorton and Metrick, that the business model mandated for NFBs might not
be viable and stable. Like all forms of narrow banks proposed over the
years, NFBs as a group would seem likely to generate relatively low rev-
enue, given the low risk of the securities in which they would have to
invest. Gorton and Metrick propose to counter this problem by granting
franchise value through the statutory monopoly on securitization men-
tioned earlier and through access to the Federal Reserve’s discount win-
dow. Picking up on their analogy to the creation of deposit insurance in the
1930s, the monopoly on securitization is intended to help offset the regula-
tory costs imposed on NFBs in the same way that the monopoly on the
“business of banking” was intended to offset the regulatory costs imposed
on insured depository institutions.
Unlike the business environment for banks in the 1930s, however, secu-
ritization and repo lending are national, if not international, activities, with
little to suggest that any advantage would be derived from local knowl-
edge. It seems quite possible that the economies of scale associated with
the NFB model are sufﬁciently high that the industry structure would tend
toward oligopoly, or even monopoly. That is, too much franchise value
might be created. In that event there would be signiﬁcant additions to the
cost side of the proposal’s ledger, in the form of the price and quantity
effects that result from noncompetitive industry structures.
Regardless of the eventual structure of the industry, NFBs essentially
would be monolines, with highly correlated risk exposures. They could be
particularly vulnerable to funding difﬁculties in times of deteriorating
credit conditions. Yet by the terms of Gorton and Metrick’s proposal, they
apparently would not be able to hedge interest rate or other risks. The
authors propose giving NFBs access to the discount window to forestall
liquidity problems and runs on the NFBs, presumably in the same way that
deposit insurance stopped runs on traditional banks. Here again, though,
the analogy is not a perfect one. Whereas banks and their depositors are
assured that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will keep the latter
3. The relative dormancy of these markets is also due in part to the limited supply of the
loans needed to feed the securitization process.
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whole in the event of the former’s failure, the Federal Reserve does not
make binding commitments to lend to any institution and actively discour-
ages reliance on the window for regular funding. In this regard, it is note-
worthy that the haircuts imposed on collateral presented at the discount
window rose during the recent crisis, although to a lesser extent than in the
repo market itself.
A third question about the Gorton and Metrick proposal arises because
of the signiﬁcant changes in current law and practice that it would require.
The prohibition on ABS holdings by anyone other than NFBs is the obvi-
ous and major example. But there are several others. In addition to the pos-
sibly problematic features of discount window lending in general for the
proposal, the Federal Reserve has traditionally opened the window to non-
depository institutions only in particularly stressed conditions. Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, any use of credit ratings in federal regulations will be
prohibited, an obvious complication to the proposal. This part of Dodd-
Frank has accelerated and expanded the efforts already under way at the
federal banking agencies to lessen regulatory reliance on ratings. In truth,
it may pose no greater challenge for this proposal than for many existing
capital rules.
4 Still, it may require extension of the authors’ conﬁdence that
the regulator could adequately oversee ABS ratings to conﬁdence that it
could assign ratings in the ﬁrst place. I would observe that the substantial
effort expended by staff at the Board and at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to evaluate the creditworthiness of a relatively small number of
securitizations in the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
suggests the enormity of that task. Furthermore, the wisdom of having a
government agency—even the independent central bank—assume such a
permanent, central role in credit allocation is at least subject to debate.
A final regulatory issue is raised by another feature of Gorton and
Metrick’s proposal prompted by their expectation that equity returns for
NFBs will be lower than for traditional banks. In place of the equity cap-
ital requirements generally applicable to banking organizations, they pro-
pose that NFBs issue capital notes that would be debt-like except in periods
of stress, when they would convert to equity. In essence, all of an NFB’s
capital would be contingent capital. Although contingent capital is an item
on the ﬁnancial regulatory agenda, it is considered a possible supplement to
4. For a discussion of some of the issues raised in the context of capital requirements,
see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2010).
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common equity, not a substitute for it. In this respect, the proposal moves in
the opposite direction from Basel III, which has followed markets in mak-
ing common equity the centerpiece of capital evaluation and requirements.
5
These inconsistencies with current law and practice in the Gorton and
Metrick proposal do not themselves argue against its soundness. They do,
however, underscore the degree to which the NFBs would require devel-
opment of a new ﬁnancial regulatory approach, as well as a restructuring
of the ABS and repo markets.
More generally, the existence of costs or problems with the proposal is
not sufficient grounds to reject it. In the face of very real flaws in the
precrisis state of these markets, and the failure of some ABS markets to
recover, even where it seems they could function sensibly, there is a very
good case for such a policy initiative. So let me consider briefly whether
variants on Gorton and Metrick’s basic approach might retain its core ben-
eﬁts while addressing some of its potential problems.
One possibility would be to broaden the permissible ownership of NFBs
to include bank holding companies. This modiﬁcation would make the
most sense if one believed that the proposal’s basic approach was promis-
ing but that the risks of either an untenable business model or high indus-
try concentration, and consequent anticompetitive effects, were high. It is
possible that a number of large, diversiﬁed ﬁnancial holding companies
would ﬁnd an NFB a viable part of their operations. Gorton and Metrick
would require, however, that NFBs be stand-alone entities, and they would
specifically prohibit ownership by commercial banks, in an effort to
avoid implicit contractual guarantees. This is a legitimate concern, to 
be sure, but one that might be at least imperfectly addressed through
specific restrictions on relationships between affiliates in a bank hold-
ing company. The relevant comparison is thus between the residual
costs of the regulated relationship and the effects of an anticompetitive
industry structure.
A second variant, also motivated by industry structure problems, would
be to turn NFBs from what in Gorton and Metrick’s proposal are essen-
tially privately owned public utilities into actual public utilities. However,
the extent to which this change in ownership structure would ameliorate
the anticompetitive problems is uncertain. Moreover, the concerns men-
tioned earlier with respect to government judgments on credit allocation
5. It also seems likely that the kinds of quantitative liquidity requirements currently
under development by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision would be difﬁcult for
NFBs to satisfy.
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the device of a government corporation. In addition, of course, the history
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is a cautionary tale of the potential for a
government monopoly with a conservative mandate to expand its opera-
tion into much riskier activities.
At ﬁrst glance, then, it is not at all clear that structural modiﬁcations to
Gorton and Metrick’s basic approach would be preferable to the proposal
as they have described it. Options that depart from their approach would
need to ﬁnd different ways of solving the information problems that they
identify. Let me brieﬂy note some possible alternatives that would use
regulatory requirements to create a class of ABSs in which markets could,
without inquiry into the nature and quality of the underlying assets, have
confidence even in periods of stress. One way, of course, would be to
follow more closely the deposit insurance analogy by establishing an
insurance system, a proposal that Gorton and Metrick endorse with
respect to money market funds. They suggest, however, that an insurance
system for securitization markets would be impractical because of the
existence of multiple tranches, at least some of which would be uninsur-
able and thus would, in their view, exacerbate rather than ameliorate
information problems.
Another alternative would begin with an important idea that the paper
mentions, but which is not at the center of the proposal: making the repo
bankruptcy exception available only where the collateral conforms to
certain criteria established by law or regulation. Given the demand for
repo funding, it seems worth considering whether this device could be
used to create the franchise value necessary to sustain a sizable whole-
sale funding market subject to safety and soundness regulation. Indeed,
if this approach has promise, it might be feasible for a regulatory body to
establish the requisite criteria without providing insurance. With or with-
out insurance, the “franchise value” might attach more to the instrument
than to an institution.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to enumerate the potential difﬁ-
culties with these ideas, but they are not hard to discern. In common with
the authors’ proposal, they would require a level of expertise and involve-
ment in credit rating by the government that could pose practical and, in
some conceivable versions, policy concerns. In any case, these are thoughts
for further discussion, rather than developed options. Gorton and Metrick
have, in setting forth this proposal, continued to shape our understanding of
the role and risks of the shadow banking system, while adding a speciﬁc
proposal to our menu of possible responses.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Jonathan Parker noted that runs on highly
rated securities had also happened in money market mutual funds. Under
current regulation, the quality of a money market fund cannot easily be dis-
cerned, and the structure of the fund gives fund managers little incentive to
become informed about the quality of highly rated assets. Thus, there is
often a trade-off between higher returns and an unknown amount of addi-
tional risk. Given the short-term nature of these investments, there is not
only little incentive to gather information, but often little time to gather it
when it becomes clear that information is needed. There is thus a trade-off
in regulation between liquidity—the speed with which money can be with-
drawn (or not rolled over)—and information creation. If something goes
wrong and the asset is withdrawable on demand or in the short term, I can
get out, but I will not be able to process whether that was the right decision.
The solution then seems to be to increase the terms of lending to promote
stability, so information can be gathered, but this comes at the cost of
liquidity. Parker also noted, with respect to the securitization model, that
there is no reason originators cannot be required to sell systemic securitized
risk to be insured against a macro crisis, while at the same time holding the
idiosyncratic risk of their loans for incentive reasons.
Robert Hall observed that the ﬁnancial world has a thirst to hold wealth
with a zero probability of negative nominal return. The issue raised by the
paper is the value of creating institutions that cannot go bankrupt. In a
low-inﬂation economy, this issue of preventing negative nominal returns 
is an important one, suggesting a simple change: rather than raise inﬂation,
depositors should get a lower return in exchange for a lower probability of
a negative return, while still allowing for the possibility.
Kristin Forbes suggested that the paper was in effect saying that the
shadow banking system arose to compensate for shortcomings in the bank-
ruptcy system, and especially the length of time to resolve a bankruptcy case.
If that is so, one would expect that countries with stronger bankruptcy
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ing systems. Do the cross-country data support this? Her prior was that they
did not. Countries such as the United States have fairly strong and effective
bankruptcy systems yet have the largest shadow banking systems.
Phillip Swagel thought that Andrei Shleifer’s concern over the authors’
proposal involving nationalization of the nonagency repo market was
misplaced. The proposal would remove some of the existing legal protec-
tion for repo transactions that do not involve high-quality collateral. Thus, it
would reduce government coverage, not increase it. This seemed to Swagel
a reasonable way to provide an incentive for the use of better collateral. On
the other hand, there should be greater understanding of the limits to which
high-quality collateral matters. The week after Lehman Brothers failed, the
U.S. Treasury offered insurance for money market mutual funds. What was
striking was that essentially all of these funds—even those that invested
only in securities that were already government-guaranteed, such as Trea-
sury and agency bonds—chose to buy the insurance. These funds already
had the highest-quality collateral, yet it didn’t matter; they wanted to pro-
vide even more reassurance to investors. The lesson Swagel drew was that
in a true crisis, even the best collateral is not good enough.
Steven Davis argued that it was not obvious how the authors’ proposal
ﬂowed from their interpretation of the crisis. Excessive leverage was what
contributed in many ways to the crisis, facilitating the housing bubble,
among other things. Thus, the regulatory system needs to be able to reg-
ulate leverage, for example through haircuts. For Davis, this implied a
different solution: that banks be required to hold more capital, since the
world is riskier than previously thought.
Ricardo Reis was interested in the idea of repos as a way around bank-
ruptcy. He raised three issues. First, in the cross section of countries, do we
see more use of repos (or similar instruments) in countries with the least
efﬁcient bankruptcy procedures? Second, across industries, are repos used
more in industries where ﬁnances are more opaque? And third, if the prob-
lem was the delays caused by bankruptcy proceedings, why not reform the
bankruptcy code?
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